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Multiple banking relationships: do SMEs mistrust their banks?* 
By Catherine Refait-Alexandre and Stéphanie Serve 
 
Abstract  
This article focuses on the use of multiple banking relationships by SMEs, a key issue given their 
strong dependence on bank financing in a context of increasing financial constraints and higher risk of 
credit rationing since the crisis. We investigate whether the use of multiple banking relationships is 
explained by firms’ characteristics or by the quality of the banking relationship. We exploit the results 
of an original survey conducted on a sample of French SMEs in December 2012. According to the 
traditional theoretical framework of multiple banking, we find that older, bigger, and better-
performing firms are more likely to access multiple banking relationships. We further find that 
innovative firms are more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. We also highlight the 
explanatory power of an alternative model based on the quality of banking relationship: when the 
manager trusts its main bank, or when he is closer to his loan officer, the firm will be less likely to 
engage in multiple banking relationships. 
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Multiple banking relationships: do SMEs mistrust their banks? 
 
Introduction 
Like most other continental European countries, France is characterized by a prevalence of bank 
financing, and bank debt is the most common source of external finance for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Because of their size, SMEs cannot afford the costs of disintermediation. Private 
equity is an alternative financing source, but the smallest and/or not-fast-growing firms are unattractive 
for private equity investors. Moreover, business owners are often reluctant to rely on private equity 
investors because they fear losing control of their firms. Because SMEs are strongly dependent on 
banks, they can be financially constrained as a result of credit rationing in terms of both their short-
term and long-term financing needs. According to a questionnaire addressed by the Banque de France1 
to 3,000 French SMEs over the period from October 2012 to March 2013, approximately one out of 
every six firms was credit rationed following a loan application. The study by Alexandre and Buisson-
Stéphan (2014) also provides support for the financial crisis having increased the financing constraints 
of French SMEs.  
Given their difficulty in accessing alternative external financing sources, the choice between one 
bank or several banks appears to be a key issue for SMEs to avoid credit rationing (Cosci and 
Melisciani 2002; De Bodt, Lobez, and Statnik 2005) or to improve their financing conditions. In a 
single relationship, the bank has incentives to acquire information about the borrower because the costs 
of monitoring become lower as the duration of the relationship increases: the bank may benefit from 
economies of scale, and it could smooth the cost with different types of financial services (Greenbaum 
and Thakor 1995). Moreover, a single bank avoids the problem of free riding that may arise with 
several banks. As a consequence, a single banking relationship is likely to provide SMEs protection 
against credit rationing and a guarantee that the interest rate is reduced for less-risky firms. However, a 
single bank also possesses an informational monopoly and can extract rent, thus leading SMEs to be 
charged non-competitive interest rates (Sharpe 1990). Moreover, having a single banking relationship 
exposes the borrowing SME to credit rationing if its bank undergoes a liquidity crisis (Detragiache, 
Garella, and Guiso 2000). To escape this “hold-up problem”, SMEs may be tempted to develop !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Guinouard, Kremp, and Randriamisaina (2013), Quarterly selection of articles, Banque de France, n°192, 2013. !
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multiple banking relationships to protect against credit rationing. Multiple banking may allow firms to 
benefit from diseconomies of scale in monitoring and thus obtain more competitive interest rates 
(Carletti 2004).  
One primary advantage of a banking relationship is thus to reduce the information asymmetry 
between an SME and its bank(s). Banks that lend to SMEs rely on both hard information (financial 
statements, collateral, and credit scores) and soft information, that is, information confidential to the 
lender that is obtained through social interaction (Berger, Klapper, and Udell 2001; Berger and Udell 
2006). Grunert and Norden (2012) note that banks that lend to SMEs largely rely on soft information 
because the scope of hard information is limited compared with large firms. Many studies have shown 
that the diffusion of soft information offers benefits to borrowing SMEs regarding both the availability 
of credit and the financing conditions (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 1995; Cole 1998; 
Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Harhoff and Körting 1998; Agarwal and Hauswald 2010; Grunert and Norden 
2012). The chief executive officer (CEO) plays a key role in the diffusion of soft information and, more 
generally, in banking relationships because of the ownership structure of European SMEs. According 
to the Family Business Network, 83 percent of French firms are held by an owner-manager, who is thus 
the privileged interlocutor of the bank (Brunninge, Nordqvist, and Wiklund 2007). In this context, the 
relational trust between the CEO and the bank is an indicator of the quality of the banking relationship 
(Saparito, Chen, and Sapienza 2004; Hill and Scott 2015). The prevalent role of trust in a relationship 
has been highlighted in the literature, both because trust helps to reduce agency problems (Nooteboom, 
Berger, and Noorderhaven 1997) and because it helps to reduce the costs of monitoring and control 
(Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies 1998). More precisely, trust appears to play a strong role in the 
production of soft information and thus in the comfort of the bank to make decisions to support loans 
(Hill and Scott 2015). Following Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Lehman and Neuberger (2001), a 
recent strand of the literature focuses on the positive interaction between trust on the part of the bank 
and financing issues for borrowing SMEs (Hernandez-Canovas and Martinez-Solano 2010; Howorth 
and Moro 2012; Moro and Fink 2013). 
This paper complements the existing literature regarding the interaction between the banking 
relationship and bank financing for SMEs. More precisely, our purpose is to investigate the 
determinants of the engagement by SMEs in multiple banking relationships. We compare the 
explanatory power of two analytical frameworks. The first framework relies on traditional explanations 
linked to firms’ characteristics, and the second framework relies on more innovative explanations that 
are linked to the quality of the banking relationship. In the first framework, the use of single versus 
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multiple banking relationships can be driven by the financial and economic situation of the firm. To 
escape from the risk of hold-up, a healthy firm may favor multiple relationships (Sharpe 1990). A firm 
that anticipates financial distress may also develop multiple relationships to favor risk sharing and 
support from its creditors in case of financial difficulties (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 2000). These 
arguments primarily rely on the presence of information asymmetry to the detriment of banks. In the 
second framework, we analyze the determinants of multiple banking relationships in light of the quality 
of the banking relationship. We use trust on the part of the CEO of the SME as a primary indicator of 
the quality of the banking relationship. Because information asymmetry to the detriment of firms also 
exists, the trust that a firm feels toward its main bank plays a strong role in the construction of the 
relationship. In the case of mistrust, firms could be tempted to engage in multiple banking 
relationships. Following the framework of trust provided by Morgan and Hunt (1994), we test the 
impact of several dimensions of trust, its antecedents and its consequences on the likelihood of a firm 
to engage in multiple banking relationships.  
This paper makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the literature about banking 
relationships. Multiple banking relationships are rarely analyzed based on the quality of the relationship 
between the firm and its main bank. Moreover, contrary to previous studies that have focused on the 
quality of the relationship from the point of view of the bank (that is the loan officer’s point of view), 
we analyze this relationship from the point of view of the key individual, the CEO. Second, we created 
original proxies to assess the trust that firms have in their banks. This unique dataset is provided by a 
questionnaire addressed to managers of French SMEs in 2012. CEOs were asked to provide answers 
about financing conditions and various aspects of their relationship with their bank(s) during the period 
of 2007-2012. This period is interesting because it includes the emergence of financial and economic 
crises that may have played a role in banking relationships. The volume of loans granted by banks 
decreased since the crisis, and the financial vulnerability of banks increased. However, according to 
Kremp and Sevestre (2013), this decrease appears to be generated by a decrease in demand rather than 
by pure credit rationing. Thus, this paper helps to investigate the “demand size” aspect of the banking 
relationship in a context of increasing uncertainty that makes the banking relationship worthwhile for 
the two players (Albertazzi and Marchetti 2010). The use of responses to the survey regarding the 
investment or financing needs of SMEs also enriches the empirical evidence regarding the traditional 
framework about banking relationships. 
Our sample comprises 94 French SMEs that responded to the survey in December 2012. We exploit 
the responses to the survey, and we also extracted accounting data from the ALTARES database. Our 
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results are twofold. First, we provide support for the explanatory power of some firms’ characteristics 
in terms of engagement in single or multiple banking relationships: larger, older, and better-performing 
firms are more likely to develop multiple banking relationships, as are innovative firms. Second, we 
provide original results that show that the quality of the banking relationship affects the access to 
multiple banking relationships. According to our hypothesis, we find that when the manager trusts his 
main bank, he is less likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. Our results also highlight the 
role of the distance between the manager and his main bank: when the manager is closer to his loan 
officer, he is less likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. However, these explanatory 
frameworks are not mutually exclusive: among the models tested, the combined models that include 
both firms’ characteristics and proxies for the quality of banking relationships provide the best 
predictive power for the likelihood to engage in multiple banking relationships.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we analyze the theoretical 
background and empirical evidence on the two alternative frameworks. Section 3 presents the data and 
summary statistics in addition to the results of the univariate analysis. Our main empirical findings are 
provided in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
Theoretical Background and Empirical Review 
Framework One: Firms’ Characteristics and Multiple Banking 
Theoretical Framework. Banking theory demonstrates that there exists a link between firms’ 
characteristics and their choice between single and multiple banking relationships. Borrowing from 
several banks generates higher monitoring costs per euro borrowed (Berger, Klapper, and Udell 2001). 
As a consequence, for small firms, banks’ incentives to monitor are lower, and the process of granting 
credit is likely to be transaction-based rather than being the result of a full banking relationship. 
Conversely, for larger firms that borrow higher volumes, several banks can invest in monitoring 
activities because of economies of scale. Thus, according to this theory, the larger the firm is, the easier 
it is to engage in multiple banking relationships. From the point of view of the bank, the argument for 
risk sharing also favors multiple banking for firms that borrow large volumes. Regarding the age of the 
firm, a young firm is more likely than an older one to have a single banking relationship for two 
reasons. First, it is difficult for a young firm to attract several banks because of the high information 
asymmetry regarding its growth prospects and its risk. Moreover, a single bank has more incentives to 
monitor the firm because of the absence of free riding and because of economies of scale in monitoring 
activities. This gives the young firm protection against credit rationing. Moreover, when a firm grows, 
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this information asymmetry decreases because some financial information becomes public. 
Consequently, the need for a single bank, with high incentives to monitor, becomes less important than 
the need for risk sharing and the search for new financing as the firm become older. We further posit 
hypothesis H1. 
H1: Smaller and younger firms are less likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. 
Second, the choice between single and multiple banking is impacted by the performance of the firm 
and its default risk. The theoretical literature provides two alternative frameworks to explain this 
impact. On one side, a single banking relationship incites the bank to monitor the firm to collect 
information about its performance and its risk (Fama 1985; Haubrich 1989; Greenbaum and Thakor 
1995). Thus, well-performing firms may benefit from a single relationship: they are protected against 
credit rationing, and their bank applies a low interest rate. On the other side, Sharpe (1990) shows that 
a single relationship provides an informational rent to the bank because other banks that do not know 
the risk of the firm fear adverse selection. This informational monopoly power makes the firm captive. 
As a consequence, a firm may not benefit from low interest rates even if it is performing well, and it 
could be credit rationed if the bank suffers from a liquidity crisis (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 
2000). In this context, multiple banking relationships allow the firm to escape from informational 
monopoly power because at least two banks are well informed about its probability of success, and thus 
there is competition. Therefore, a well-performing firm may have an interest in developing multiple 
banking relationships. Because of these two different explanations, we posit hypothesis H2a and 
alternative hypothesis H2b. 
H2a: High-performing firms are less likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. 
H2b: High-performing firms are more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships.  
Third, the level of default risk could also affect the choice between single and multiple banking 
relationships. On the one hand, the manager could favor multiple banking relationships to be better 
supported in case of financial distress during a debt renegotiation process. The presence of several 
banks allows risk sharing, protects banks from adverse selection and facilitates financial support from 
several creditors (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 2000). On the other hand, the presence of several 
banks could also create free riding in monitoring (Carletti 2004) and could reduce the incentive for the 
main bank to seek information and to finance a firm in financial distress. Thus, the manager could also 
be tempted to choose a single banking relationship to avoid credit rationing. In this vein, the model of 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) indicates that concentrated lending relationships facilitate debt 
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renegotiation, at least for low-credit-quality firms. Because of these two different explanations, we 
posit hypothesis H3a and alternative hypothesis H3b. 
H3a: Firms anticipating financial distress are less likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. 
H3b: Firms anticipating financial distress are more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships.  
Finally, because confidentiality is valuable for firms engaging in research and development 
(Bhattacharya and Chiesa 1995), an innovative firm could be less inclined to disclose information to its 
bank because of the need for confidentiality. Yosha (1995) and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) show 
that a situation with multiple creditors may lead to the disclosure of strategic information to banks and 
therefore to competitors. Thus, Yosha (1995) shows that innovative firms prefer a single bank to reduce 
financing costs because of a lower need for (costly) disclosure. Similarly, we posit hypothesis H4. 
H4: Innovative firms are less likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. 
Empirical Evidence. The connection between firm size and banking relationships is supported by 
empirical evidence. Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001) show that small firms are more likely to borrow 
from a single bank because of the high costs of monitoring. This result was confirmed by Harhoff and 
Körting (1998) for a sample of German firms and by Ziane (2003) for a sample of French SMEs. The 
idea of a life cycle in banking relationships with the probability of multiple banking relationships 
increasing with the age of the borrower was successfully tested by Harhoff and Körting (1998) and by 
Farinha and Santos (2002) for Portuguese SMEs (hypothesis H1). Regarding performance, empirical 
evidence provides strong support for a negative relationship between SMEs’ performance and the use 
of multiple banking (hypothesis H2a) in several countries: the United States (Detragiache, Garella, and 
Guiso 2000), Belgium (Degryse and Ongena 2001), France (Ziane 2003), and Italy (Castelli, Dwyer, 
and Hasan 2010). Empirical evidence regarding default risk was provided by Cosci and Meliciani 
(2002): they find that the! number of banking relationships increases with firms’ leverage and the 
riskiness of the sectors in which the firms operate. Moreover, Harhoff and Körting (1998) report that 
firms in financial distress have several relationships and that the number of creditors has a positive 
influence on the resolution of this distress (hypothesis H3b). Finally, regarding innovation, the 
empirical evidence is mixed. Bellucci, Favaretto, and Giombini (2014) recently showed that innovative 
firms are less likely to suffer from credit rationing, which reduces their need for developing multiple 
banking relationships (hypothesis H4). However, Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Detragiache, Garella, 
and Guiso (2000) find a negative impact of the innovation of products on the probability of having a 
single banking relationship.  
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The literature also analyzes the consequences of single and multiple banking relationships on the 
cost and availability of credit. It appears that the positive value of a single banking relationship (lower 
information asymmetry and agency costs) appears to outweigh hold-up problems. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), Cole (1998) and Cotugno, Monferra, and Sampagnaro (2013) show that US SMEs bear higher 
interest rates and are more credit constrained when they maintain multiple banking relationships. In 
Germany (Harhoff and Körting 1998) and Belgium (De Bodt, Lobez, and Statnik 2005), empirical 
studies also show that multiple banking firms are more credit constrained and suffer from higher credit 
costs. Thus, given the high costs of multiple banking highlighted by the literature, we wonder why 
SMEs widely use multiple banking. Castelli, Dwyer, and Hasan (2010) report that 90 to 95 percent of 
firms develop multiple banking relationships in continental Europe, particularly in France (this ratio is 
lower in the United Kingdom (UK) and in Nordic countries). Consequently, we question to what extent 
multiple banking could be connected with features other than the financial characteristics of firms, and 
we propose to test an alternative framework that captures the quality of the banking relationship from 
the point of view of the borrower. 
Framework Two: Trust, Quality of the Banking Relationship and Multiple Banking 
Theoretical Framework. The impact of social interactions in banking relationships and the 
determinants of a successful banking relationship have been traditionally explored in the banking 
marketing literature. This literature posits that a “good” customer relationship is thought to be an 
important determinant of perceptions of service quality (Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman 1988). 
Banking relationships are built on not only the core service provided (that is, the loan) but also on 
general aspects that contribute to customer (that is, the SME) satisfaction. It is also in the interest of 
banks to establish and maintain long-term relationships with customers (Ritter 1993). 
Trust plays a strong role in the construction of relationships and, consequently, of banking 
relationships. Trust is a cross-disciplinary concept studied by psychologists, economists and 
sociologists. Bhattacharya, Devinney, and Pillutla (1998) remind us that the economic view of trust 
focuses on how institutions are established and incentives are used to reduce the uncertainty associated 
with transactions. In marketing, the theoretical background relies on the commitment-trust theory of 
relationship marketing originally proposed by Morgan and Hunt (1994). According to their theory, trust 
exists “when one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity”. Thus, trust is 
central to successful relationship marketing because it encourages marketers to: (1) cooperate with the 
exchange partner, (2) avoid alternative short-term strategies in favor of long-term benefits provided by 
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the relationship and (3) avoid high-risk options because they believe that the partner will not act 
opportunistically. 
The study of McKechnie, Ennew, and Read (1998) analyzes the quality of banking relationships. 
The following three aspects of banking relationships were measured via a survey distributed by post: 
trust in the bank, approachability (nature of the relationship with the loan officer) and information 
flows. Mukherjee and Nath (2003) more specifically focus on trust in the context of online banking 
relationships. They rely on the commitment-trust framework of Morgan and Hunt (1994) to 
characterize the dimensions, antecedents and consequences of trust in a structural model tested via a 
survey. First, they highlight two dimensions of trust: (1) the perceived risk as defined by Mayer, Davis, 
and Shoorman (1995) that affects the level of trust of the manager toward the firm’s bank and (2) the 
reputation of the bank. According to these dimensions, the manager should be sensitive to some of the 
bank’s features. Second, the authors identify three antecedents of trust: (1) shared value (the extent to 
which partners have beliefs in common about ethics, security and privacy; see Morgan and Hunt 1994), 
(2) communication (informal and formal sharing of meaningful and timely information; see Anderson 
and Narus 1990) and (3) opportunistic behavior (derived from the presence of information asymmetry 
in the transaction process; see Williamson 1975). Finally, Mukherjee and Nath (2003) focus on the 
consequences of trust, which are commitment and the desire to maintain a valued relationship 
(Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992).  
In a banking relationship, trust helps to reduce agency problems (Nooteboom, Berger, and 
Noorderhaven 1997) because it helps reduce the costs of monitoring and control (Lewicki, McAllister, 
and Bies 1998). If a manager trusts the firm’s bank, he will be more interested in disclosing soft 
information. On the side of the bank, this disclosure could lead to decisions to grant loans (Hill and 
Scott 2015). Conversely, if the manager mistrusts the firm’s main bank, he will develop multiple 
banking relationships to improve credit availability. Consequently, we posit hypothesis H5: 
H5: A firm that mistrusts its main bank is more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. 
Empirical Evidence. The financial literature focuses on the interaction between the quality of the 
banking relationship and the financing constraints of SMEs. For instance, seminal studies (Petersen and 
Rajan 1994; Cole 1998) rely on the NSSBF2 inquiry (a questionnaire performed on a large sample of 
US SMEs) to exploit quantitative aspects of the banking relationship: its age and its length (as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 National Survey of Small Business Finances.!
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measured by pre-existing financial services variables: checking accounts, savings accounts, loans, and 
financial management services). Lehman and Neuberger (2001) address a questionnaire to loan officers 
of three German banks to capture social aspects of the banking relationship with multi-item scales 
related to positive experience in the past, willingness of the borrower to inform them about problems, 
obligation to the borrower and stability of the relationship. They show that financing conditions are 
influenced by not only firms’ characteristics and credit risk variables but also the previously defined 
social aspects. 
However, the role of trust as a primary indicator of the banking relationship remains a less-
examined issue in the SME financing literature. Harhoff and Körting (1998) first tested the impact of a 
binary variable named a “trust variable” (managers had to indicate to what extent they consider their 
banking relationship as being characterized by mutual trust) on a sample of German SMEs; their results 
indicate that SMEs characterized by concentrated borrowing and a trusting banking relationship 
obtained better financing conditions. More recently, Hernandez-Canovas and Martinez-Solano (2010) 
ask managers whether they think that banks consider trust in granting loans; their results show a 
positive association with this indirect measure of trust and better access to financing at better prices for 
Spanish SMEs. Evidence for similar interactions between trust and interest rates is provided by 
Howorth and Moro (2012) based on a sample of Italian SMEs. Finally, Moro and Fink (2013) use a 
survey addressed to the loan officers of nine Italian banks: they note that SMEs that are considered 
highly trustworthy by their banks are less credit constrained, particularly regarding short-term 
financing.  
Although this stream of literature focuses on trust to explain credit availability and the financing 
conditions of SMEs, it does not investigate the link between trust and the use of multiple banking. 
Moreover, previous studies assess trust from the point of view of the bank. In contrast with these 
studies, we estimate trust from the viewpoint of the manager and its impact on the use of multiple 
banking. 
Data and Univariate Analysis 
Sources 
 Accounting data were extracted from a French database, ALTARES, provided by Dun and 
Bradstreet, which offers extensive coverage of privately held French firms. The ALTARES database 
contains comprehensive accounting and financial data, the business sector code, and the age of the 
firm.  
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Data about the quality of banking relationships were obtained from a questionnaire that we 
designed. In addition to firms and managers’ characteristics, the questionnaire inquired about 
investment policy and financing needs. Then, the managers were asked questions related to the 
characteristics of banking relationships: the use of single or multiple banking, and several aspects of the 
quality of banking relationships, including several dimension of the trust that the CEO feels toward the 
firm’s main bank. The survey was sent by mail to managers of French SMEs in December 2012. It was 
addressed to the CEOs of the SMEs. 908 managers opened the email. Phone calls were made to follow 
up on some partially completed questionnaires, leading to a sample of 94 SMEs. Of these 94 SMEs, 25 
did not fully complete the section of the questionnaire regarding the banking relationship, and 13 firms 
reported missing accounting data in ALTARES. These steps and the composition of the sample are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Insert table 1 about here 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. The definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix A. 
Considering the three criteria required in the European definition of SMEs (workforce < 250 
employees, net sales < 50 million euros, and total assets < 43 million euros), we note that the SMEs in 
the sample belong to the “small” range of SMEs. They exhibit a median workforce of 31 employees, 
median sales of 4.3 million euros and median assets of 2.6 million euros. They appear to be quite 
mature, with a median age of 21 years. The median leverage of 63.9 percent is close to the threshold 
usually used in financial analysis to assess the financial structure (two tier of debt, or one tier of 
equity). Regarding the business sector, the industrial sector is prevalent, with 43.1 percent of the SMEs 
in this business, followed by services (24.3 percent). Of the total, 16.8 percent answered yes to the 
following question: “Is your firm innovative according to the definition provided by the French Tax 
Code?”3 
Insert table 2 about here 
Regarding multiple banking, the respondents were asked about the use of multiple banks (dummy 
variable Multibank): 74 firms reported multiple banking relationships (Multibank equals one), and 20 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Under article 44 sexies-0 A of the French Tax Code, a young innovative company is an SME that has R&D expenditures 
equal to at least 15% of its deductible expenses for the fiscal year. !
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firms reported single banking relationships (Multibank equals zero). Thus, 79 percent of the firms 
reported multiple banking relationships in our sample. This result is consistent with, albeit a bit lower 
than, the data provided by Ongena and Smith (2000) and more recently by Castelli, Dwyer, and Hasan 
(2010) for continental European countries: the latter report a multiple banking ratio of 95 percent for 
their sample of Italian SMEs, and the former report a percentage of 85 percent.  
Variables and Univariate Analysis 
Multiple Banking and Firms’ Characteristics (Framework One). According to hypothesis H1, we posit 
that the age of the firm (Age) and its size (using Workforce, Assets and Sales) exhibit a positive 
relationship with the use of multiple banking (the definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 
A). In hypotheses H2a and H2b, we assume contrasting expectations regarding the impact of 
performance on multiple banking: the performance variables are one-year sales growth (Growth), 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). We constructed the instrumental variable VIROE 
to correct reverse causality (see below). We also assume contrasting expectations regarding the 
anticipated default risk (hypotheses H3a and H3b). We use the following variables: the liquidity ratio 
(Liquidity) and the leverage ratio (Leverage) to proxy for this risk. In addition, according to hypothesis 
H4, we assume that innovative firms are more likely to report a single banking relationship. We use a 
dummy variable (Innovation) that equals 1 if the SME answers “no” to the question “Is your firm 
innovative according to the definition of the French Tax Code?” and 0 otherwise. 
Differences in investment and financing needs are also expected to have an impact on the use of 
multiple banks; thus, we include several control variables to capture these needs. These variables are 
the responses to the questions that we asked following the NSSBF inquiry (see, for example, Cole 
1998). We use two proxies for financial needs: the dummy variable LT debt-need (that equals1 if the 
firm has applied for a long term loan since 2007) proxies for long term needs, and the ratio of working 
capital to net sales (Working capital) proxies for short-term needs. In addition, Invest-need is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the SME invested since the crisis and 0 otherwise. 
Insert table 3 about here 
Table 3 provides statistics and univariate analysis for the previously mentioned variables for the 
sample of 81 SMEs with available accounting data4. Among them, 80 percent (64) reported multiple 
banking relationships, and 20 percent (17) reported a single banking relationship. The first important !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 We provide correlation matrices in Appendices B and C. 
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figures are related to the age and size of the firms: they highlight significant differences between firms 
with several banks and firms with one bank. More precisely, firms with several banks appear to be 
older and larger (in terms of Assets and Sales) than firms with one bank in terms of both the mean and 
median. These preliminary results are consistent with hypothesis H1. Univariate tests also highlight the 
significance of the variable Innovation, which is higher for the group of SMEs with multiple banks 
(20.6 percent of the firms with multiple banking relationships are innovative versus 6 percent of the 
firms with one bank). This result is not consistent with H4, but it is consistent with some of the 
empirical evidence: innovative firms do not seem to be reluctant to disclose information to several 
banks.  
Regarding the control variables, firms with several banks exhibit higher short-term financing needs, 
with an average working capital ratio of 19.7 percent, than firms with one bank, which have an average 
working capital ratio of 5.3 percent. Finally, the variable Invest-need also differs significantly between 
the two groups: 47 percent of the respondents invested since the crisis in the “single banking group,” 
whereas only 26 percent of the “multiple banking group” invested. Thus, it appears that SMEs that 
reported a single banking relationship were not constrained in terms of investments over the period.  
Multiple Banking and the Quality of the Banking Relationship. The variables presented in this 
framework are extracted from the responses to the survey addressed to CEOs. According to hypothesis 
H5, we use several proxies to assess trust. We rely on the characterization of trust proposed by 
Mukherjee and Nath (2003) to build variables that capture the antecedents of trust and its 
consequences. One main antecedent of trust is information asymmetry between the bank and the SME. 
We exploit two questions from the survey as proxies for this issue: Rating knowledge and Bank 
knowledge. Rating knowledge equals one if the CEO thinks that he has knowledge of the rating process 
of the firm’s main bank and zero otherwise. Bank knowledge equals one if the manager thinks that he 
has knowledge about how a bank is working and zero otherwise. Another important antecedent of trust 
is communication and sharing of information. We use the dummy variable Frequency as a proxy for the 
frequency of exchanges between the CEO and the bank.!Frequency equals one if the SME answers 
“yes” to the question “Do you have exchanges on at least a weekly basis with the loan officer of your 
main bank” and zero otherwise. Finally, we assess the consequences of trust, that is, the desire to build 
a valuable relationship, using the variable Rate. Rate is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
manager answers “no” to the following question: “Do you systematically look for the lower interest 
rate when applying for credit?” Conversely, Rate equals zero if the manager’s aim is always to find a 
lower rate by seeking competition among banks.  
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We include a control variable called Distance. Distance is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
SME reports that its loan officer is located in a business center and zero if the officer is located in a 
bank branch. Distance is treated in the literature as another dimension of the quality of the banking 
relationship. As noted by Degryse and Ongena (2005), the operational distance, that is, the physical 
proximity of the firm to its bank, can help reduce information asymmetry. Banks that are closer to the 
borrowing firms should need to exert less effort to monitor the firm and should benefit from more soft 
information. Degryse and Ongena (2005) actually show that loan rates decrease with the distance 
between the firm and the lending bank for Belgian SMEs. Conversely, Alessandrini, Presbitero, and 
Zazzaro (2009) find no impact of operational distance on credit availability for Italian SMEs.!!
Finally, we use CEO tenure as a second control variable: this dummy variable equals one if the CEO 
has been in the position for more than five years (long-term position) and zero otherwise. We assume 
that CEO tenure is likely to have an impact on the quality of the banking relationship. A strand of the 
SME literature analyzes the financing decisions of SMEs in light of their CEOs’ demographics. For 
instance, Bruns and Fletcher (2008) find a positive impact of CEO tenure on the probability of the loan 
officer supporting credit for Swedish SMEs, whereas Orens and Reheul (2013) use CEO tenure as an 
explanatory factor for the cash holdings of Belgian SMEs.  
Insert table 4 about here 
Table 4 exhibits the results of the univariate analysis on the sample of 69 firms that fully completed 
the banking relationship section of the survey. Among them, 59 (85 percent) have multiple banking 
relationships, and 10 (15 percent) have a single banking relationship.  
Regarding the full sample of 69 firms, it appears that 55.1 percent of the respondents reported 
knowledge about the general working process of a bank (Bank knowledge), but of the respondents, 
only 37.7 percent answered that they have knowledge about the rating process of their bank (Rating 
knowledge). A vast majority of the respondents (80.6 percent) reported regular exchanges (on a weekly 
basis) with the loan officer of their main bank (Frequency). In addition, only 30.3 percent of the 
respondents answered that they are not systematically looking for the lowest price when applying for a 
loan (Rate). Almost one-half of the SMEs in our sample work with a loan officer located in a business 
center (the variable Distance has a mean of 44.9 percent), and the others work with a loan officer 
housed in a bank branch. Finally, for 89.5 percent of the SMEs, the CEOs have had a long tenure.  
The univariate analysis indicates differences between the two groups. First, regarding knowledge, 10 
percent of the respondents in the “single banking” group reported knowledge of the rating process 
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(Rating knowledge), whereas 42.4 percent of the respondents in the “multiple banking” group reported 
such knowledge. These results are consistent with the analysis of Bank knowledge, which is also 
significantly higher for the “multiple banking” group than for the “single banking” group. To 
summarize, these preliminary results tend to support the idea that firms with one bank exhibit lower 
knowledge of the bank process in general than firms with multiple banks. In addition, the dummy 
variable Rate is significantly higher for the single bank group: in this group, 60 percent of the 
respondents reported that they do not search for the lowest loan price; conversely, more than 75 percent 
of the respondents in the “multiple banking” group search for a lower interest rate when applying for 
credit. 
Regarding the control variables, only 10 percent of the respondents in the “single banking” group 
work with a loan officer located in a business center. This result implies that conversely, 90 percent of the 
respondents in this subsample work with a loan officer located in a bank branch, thus with a lower 
distance. For the multiple banking subsample, the distance is significantly higher because 50.8 percent of 
the respondents work with a loan officer located in a business center. SMEs with several banks also 
exhibit a significantly higher percentage of long-tenured CEOs (93.1 percent) than SMEs with one bank 
(77.8 percent). 
Empirical Findings 
The Econometric Specification 
Econometric Model and Estimation Method. The endogenous variable is a dummy variable 
(Multibank); Multibank equals one if the firm has multiple banking relationships and zero if the firm 
has a single banking relationship. We use the two sets of explanatory variables to test the previously 
defined analytical frameworks. We run models for framework one, models for framework two, and we 
also run combined models by integrating the explanatory variables of the two analytical frameworks.  
We use a bivariate probit model. yi is the dependent variable for firm i, xi is the vector of 
independent variables for firm i, and β is the vector of coefficients. 
                      (1) 
€ 
yi =1 if βxi +ε i > 0
yi = 0 if βxi +ε i ≤ 0
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We assume the standard normal distribution for the disturbance, ei. Let F be the normal distribution. 
The probability that the dependent variable yi equals one (that is, firm i has multiple banking 
relationships) is  
                 (2) 
The probability that the dependent variable yi equals zero (that is, firm i has a single banking 
relationship) is 
             (3) 
For each model, the vector β is estimated using the maximum likelihood. There is no important 
problem of multicollinearity (the variance inflation factors are all inferior to 10)5. We corrected the 
models for heteroscedasticity.  
The McFadden likelihood ratio index (McFadden R2) measures the goodness of fit of our estimated 
models: 
McFadden R2 = 1-lnL/lnL0                  (4) 
where L is the likelihood of the estimated model, and lnL0 is the likelihood of the model with only a 
constant term (for more details, see Greene 2011). 
The global significance of our model is assessed by the likelihood-ratio test. The null hypothesis is 
the nullity of all of the coefficients. Under H0, S=2(lnL-lnL0) follows a chi-square distribution with K-1 
degrees of freedom, where K is the number of exogenous variables. The significance of each 
coefficient of the vector β is also assessed using the likelihood-ratio test. The null hypothesis is the 
nullity of the coefficient βi. L is compared to Lβi=0, the likelihood of the model estimated under H0. 
Under H0, S=2(lnL-ln Lβi=0) follows a chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom. 
We provide two other indicators of the goodness of fit: the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and 
the rate of correct classification. AIC =-2lnL-2K, where K is the number of exogenous variables. The 
lower the criterion is, the better the goodness of fit. The rate of correct classification is equal to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 VIF(j) = 1/(1 - R(j)^2), where R(j) is the multiple correlation coefficient between the independent variable j and the other 
independent variables.  !!
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ratio of the number of firms for which the endogenous variable is correctly predicted to the total 
number of firms. 
Treatment of Missing Data. The size of our sample is reduced because of missing data (see Table 1). 
Framework one suffers from missing accounting data: among 94 firms, accounting data are available 
for only 81. Framework two suffers from a lack of responses to the survey. Among 94 firms, only 69 
answered the questions about banking relationships. Furthermore, only 59 firms answered these 
questions and provided accounting data. To test the robustness of our econometric models of 
frameworks one and two and to run a combined model integrating the two frameworks, we impute 
values for missing data (as in, for instance, Astebro and Bernhardt 2003 and Fairlie and Robb 2007) 
We use two different methods for the imputation of missing data: regression imputation and 
multiple imputation6. First, in regression imputation, we consider the variables with missing data one 
by one as dependent variables of a regression. A linear regression is used for continuous variables, and 
a logistic regression is used for dummy variables. The imputed variables are the values predicted by 
these regressions. Second, we use a multiple imputation method described by Rubin (1976; 1987), 
more precisely, multivariate imputation by chained equations (Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 
2011). Missing data are imputed by considering the statistical links between the different variables 
thanks to an iterative assessment. For the continuous variables, we use the predictive mean matching 
method; for the dummy variable, we use a linear discriminant analysis. Treatment of missing data 
allows us to build two samples of 94 observations for each econometrical model assessed.  
Treatment of Reverse Causality. The theoretical framework assumes that the performance of a firm 
explains the choice between single and multiple banking relationships (hypotheses H2a and H2b). 
However, some empirical studies also show that multiple banking relationships may have an influence 
on firm performance. Actually, multiple banking relationships can soften the control that banks exert 
and, as a consequence, reduce managers’ incentives to exert significant effort (Foglia, Laviola, and 
Reedtz 1998). An indirect effect can also play a role because multiple banking relationships influence 
the cost and availability of credit (Bonfim, Dai, and Franco 2009; Shikimi 2013). Moreover, Castelli, 
Dwyer, and Hasan (2010) find a negative impact of multiple banking relationships on SMEs’ 
performance. Thus, a double causality can exist between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable ROE because the number of banks in 2011 could explain the financial return in 2011. To avoid !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See, for instance, Allison (2001) and Chen and Astebro (2003) for more details.!
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this problem of reverse causality, we construct an instrumental variable. We consider the average 
financial return from 2007 to 2010 (VIROE, see Appendix A). This past value cannot be influenced by 
the current value of the dependent variable.  
Firms’ Characteristics and the Use of Multiple Banking Relationships 
According to the first analytic framework (hypotheses H1 to H4), we estimate the following model: 
Proba (MULTIBANK = 1) = Function (SIZE, AGE, PERFORMANCE, RISK, INNOVATION, 
CONTROL VARIABLES)  
Table 5 provides the results of the probit models. The first model (model I) is run on the initial 
sample with the available accounting data (column Ia). Then, this model is run on the full sample of 94 
SMEs after imputation of the missing data via multiple imputation (column Ib) and regression 
imputation (column Ic). The second model (model II) uses VIROE instead of ROE to control for 
reverse causality. It is run on the initial sample of 81 firms (column IIa); then, we control for robustness 
after imputation of the missing data by multiple imputation (column IIb) and regression imputation 
(column IIc). The McFadden R2 ranges between 26.42 percent and 36.96 percent. The models exhibit 
rates of reclassification that range between 81.2 percent and 86.2 percent. 
Insert table 5 about here 
Several results emerge. First, according to hypothesis H1, we find that the size of the firms (Assets) 
increase their probability to engage in multiple banking relationships. This result is in line with the 
empirical literature (Harhoff and Körting 1998; Berger, Klapper, and Udell 2001; Ziane 2003). Second, 
according to hypothesis H2b, we find that the best performing firms - looking at the return on equity 
ROE - are more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. This result is robust when VIROE is 
used instead of ROE. Thus, the anticipated positive consequence of a single relationship seems to be 
outweighed by the desire of protection against monopoly power. Contrary to previous studies 
(Detagriache, Garella, and Guiso 2000; Degryse and Ongena 2001; Ziane 2003; Castelli, Dwyer, and 
Hasan 2010), our findings tend to support the idea that, during the 2007-2012 period, in spite of the 
persistence of the crisis, well performing firms tried to protect themselves against the hold-up problem.  
Third, the leverage ratio (Leverage) appears to have a positive impact on the decision to engage in 
multiple banking relationships. As we used Leverage as a proxy for anticipated default risk, this result gives 
some support to hypothesis H3b: a firm anticipating financial distress could favor multiple banking 
relationships to obtain better support in case of default. On the part of the bank, higher leverage is also 
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consistent with a higher need for sharing risk. This result is consistent with the findings of Harhoff and 
Körting (1998). 
Contrary to hypothesis H4, the innovative characteristic of firms (variable Innovation) has a positive 
impact on the use of multiple banking relationships. This result is in line with empirical evidence that shows 
that innovative firms are not reluctant to disclose information to multiple lenders (Harhoff and Körting, 
1998 and Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso, 2000). Moreover, the desire of the main bank to share risk 
with other lenders is higher for innovative firms that appear to be more risky, and that exhibit few tangible 
assets, making it more difficult for them to provide collateral.   
In addition, the control variables provide interesting results. The variable Working capital, a proxy 
for short-term financing needs, exhibits a positive relationship with the use of multiple banking: SMEs 
with high short-term financing needs incur a higher risk of credit rationing; thus, they are more likely to 
work with multiple banks. The variable Invest-need has a negative impact on the use of multiple 
banking: SMEs that invested during the crisis will perhaps exhibit less financing needs, leading to less 
use of multiple banking at the time that they completed the survey. An alternative explanation provided 
by the literature (Von Thadden 1995) is that investment financing requires a single banking relationship 
because monitoring activity and time smoothing of profits makes long-term financing possible for 
banks.  
Quality of the Banking Relationship and the Use of Multiple Banking 
According to the second analytical framework, we test models that include proxies for trust and two 
control variables (Distance and CEO tenure). 
Proba (MULTIBANK = 1) = Function (TRUST, CONTROL VARIABLES) 
Table 6 provides the results of the probit models. The first model (model III) is performed on the 
sample of SMEs with available responses to the survey (column IIIa). Then, we control for the 
robustness of this model using the full sample of 94 SMEs after the imputation of missing data using 
both multiple imputation (column IIIb) and regression imputation (column IIIc). Model (IV) presents 
an alternative empirical model of framework two, including the CEO tenure. Model IV is run on the 
initial sample of firms (column IVa); then, we control for the robustness of model IV after imputation 
of missing data with both multiple imputation (column IVb) and regression imputation (column IVc). 
Insert table 6 about here  
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The McFadden R2 ranges between 31.39 and 50.41 percent. The models exhibit rates of 
reclassification that range between 85.1 percent and 92.6 percent. 
A first finding is the strong impact of the two proxies of trust. The proxy for the antecedent of trust, 
Rating knowledge, has a positive impact on the use of multiple banking. However, this impact is 
contrary to our expectation: if the CEO reports knowledge of the rating process of the firm’s main 
bank, he is more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. A possible explanation is that 
higher transparency from the main bank may lead SMEs to boost competition between different banks. 
Another explanation is consistent with Sharpe (1990): if the manager knows well the rating process, he 
becomes conscious of the hold-up phenomenon and tries to avoid it by developing multiple banking 
relationships. The model also highlights, as expected in Hypothesis H5, a negative impact of the 
consequence of trust, that is, the desire of the manager to build a valuable relationship with his main 
bank (variable Rate), on the likelihood of multiple banking relationships. When the manager’s aim is 
not to systematically find the lower rate, he is more likely to have a single bank. When the manager 
trusts the firm’s main bank, he wants to develop a relationship founded on something other than price. 
He thus values a single banking relationship in which he can disclose more soft information to the 
bank. This result is consistent with the empirical studies that highlighted the strong role of soft 
information in the availability of credit (Berger and Udell 2002; 2006). The variable Frequency also 
has a positive, albeit not very significant, impact on the use of multiple banking relationships, contrary 
to our expectations: we anticipated that frequent exchanges between the firm and its main bank could 
improve trust. However, this proxy remains imperfect because the survey does not make us aware of 
the natures of the exchanges. One possible explanation is that this variable may reveal some financial 
problems (particularly regarding the operations of the account), thus leading to a search for others 
lenders.  
Another result is the positive impact of the control variable Distance on the use of multiple banking. 
When the manager of an SME is more geographically distant from his loan officer (that is, when the 
officer is located in a business center rather than in a branch), he is more likely to engage in multiple 
banking relationships. This result is consistent with studies that show that a lower distance leads to 
better financing conditions and credit availability (Degryse and Ongena 2005; Alessandrini, Presbitero, 
and Zazzaro 2009). Finally, CEO tenure also appears to have a positive impact on the use of several 
banks: when the CEO has had a long tenure and is thus more experienced, he is more likely to engage 
in multiple banking relationships. This result may be explained by the fact that the experience of the 
CEO enhances trust from banks, thereby making it easier for firms to engage in multiple relationships.  
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Firms’ Characteristics and the Quality of the Banking Relationship: The Effects of 
Interactions on the Probability of Engaging in Multiple Banking Relationships 
Using imputation of missing data, Table 7 provides models that include both variables from 
framework one and variables from framework two from the common sample of 94 SMEs (with 
imputation of missing data). We run four different global models combining the models from 
frameworks one and two7. Columns Va, VIa, VIIa and VIIIa present the models run on the sample built 
by multiple implementation. Columns Vb, VIb, VIIb and VIIIb presents the models run on the sample 
built by regression implementation.  
 
Insert table 7 about here 
Insert table 8 about here  
Table 8 provides a comparison of the goodness of fit values of the models derived from framework 
one, from framework two and from the combined models regarding their ability to explain the presence 
of single versus multiple banking relationships. The results show that the quality of the banking 
relationship (framework two) provides a better explanation for this choice than the characteristics of the 
firms (framework one): the McFadden R2 is higher (except for one regression), the AIC and the BIC 
(Bayesian Information or Schwarz criterion) are always lower, and the rates of correct classification are 
always higher. For instance, the better rate of correct classification is provided by framework two 
applied to the sample imputed by regression: 92.6 percent (Model III).  
Furthermore, tables 7 and 8 indicate that the combined models improve the explanation of multiple 
banking relationships. First, the explanatory variables of the two frameworks remain significant in the 
combined models. The explanatory powers of the global models are high, with McFadden R2 values 
ranging between 57.47 and 71.84 percent. The rates of correct classification vary between 88.3 and 
94.7 percent. The AIC and the BIC are lower for the combined models. In summary, it appears that the 
two explanatory frameworks are not mutually exclusive because combining the financial characteristics 
of SMEs with proxies for the quality of the banking relationship improves the ability of the model to 
explain the use of banking relationships by SMEs.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 We combined model III with model I (model V) and II (model VI). Then, we combined model IV with model I (model 
VII) and II (model VIII).!
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Conclusion  
In France, similar to most countries in continental Europe, a vast majority of SMEs develop multiple 
banking relationships. We examined the determinants of the use of multiple banking relationships 
during a period of financial and economic crises. Using a unique dataset provided by a survey 
completed by the CEOs of French SMEs, we analyzed the probability for SMEs to engage in single or 
multiple banking relationships. We used two analytical frameworks: the first was based on firms’ 
characteristics, and the second was based on trust as a primary indicator of the quality of banking 
relationships.  
We first show the role played by the characteristics of the firm, including its age and size, and the 
role of performance in the decision to engage in multiple banking relationships. It appears that well-
performing firms are more likely to develop multiple banking relationships to protect themselves from 
the extraction of informational rent by their main banks. In line with some empirical studies, we show 
that innovative firms are more inclined to engage in multiple banking relationships, perhaps because 
they exhibit higher risk, few tangible assets, thus their main bank wants to share this risk with other 
lenders. More originally, we also highlight the strong role played by the quality of the banking 
relationship. Our proxy for the consequences of trust plays a role in the decision to develop multiple 
banking relationships: when the manager only tries to find in a transaction with the lowest interest rate, 
he is more likely to develop multiple banking relationships. Conversely, when he believes in the virtue 
of a long-term relationship, he is more likely to develop a relationship with a single bank. Contrary to 
our expectations, the knowledge of CEOs regarding the rating process for the firms’ main banks 
appears to be a double-edged sword for banks: SMEs that benefit from transparency appear to be more 
likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. This result questions whether transparency is used 
by SMEs as a tool to boost competition between lenders rather than being valued as an antecedent of 
trust. We also highlight the impact of interesting control variables. We find that the geographical 
distance affects the use of multiple banking relationships: when the manager is closer to his loan 
officer, he is less engaged in multiple banking relationships. Finally, CEO tenure also appears to have a 
positive impact on the likelihood of firms to develop multiple banking relationships.  
Previous results have to be interpreted with caution because of the small sizes of the samples used. 
We propose several promising extensions that could be performed on larger samples. First, the impact 
of CEO demographics, including other characteristics such as gender, education or to what extent the 
firm is family-owned, on the use of multiple banking deserves to be analyzed in more depth (see 
D’Aurizio, Oliviero, and Romano 2015 for the interaction between the status of family firms and the 
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production of soft information). Another extension is to focus, for fragile SMEs, on the number of 
banks and on the composition of the banking pool in the case of multiple banking relationships. In 
France, banks often request intervention from the state owned bank BPI (Banque Publique 
d’Investissement) to co-finance when granting a loan to fragile SMEs. In this framework, multiple 
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Table 1 
Composition of the sample 
 
Steps Sample size  
   
SMEs that opened the email 901  
SMEs that answered the questionnaire (after phoning) 94  
SMEs with missing data in ALTARES (13)  
Sample of SMEs with accounting data 81  
SMEs with missing responses about the banking relationship (25)  
Sample of SMEs with data on the banking relationship 69  






 Observations Mean Median St.Dev. Percentage  
       
Age (in years) 94 25.85 21.20 14.45   
Workforce 94 36.44 31.00 29.20   
Assets (in M€) 81 4.05 2.60 4.86   
Sales (in M€) 81 7.07 4.25 7.51   
Leverage 81 0.65 0.64 0.30   
       
Firms with several banks 
(Multibank) 
94    78.90  
       
Firms by business sector  
   Industrial 
   Services 
   Trade 
   Transportation 
   Building 
94 







       
Innovative firms  
 
94    16.80  
 
The sample consists of 94 French SMEs for the year 2011. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. This table 





Univariate analysis of firms’ characteristics 
 
 
 Full sample  SMEs with multiple banking Multibank=1  
SMEs with one bank 
Multibank = 0 
 Mean Median St.Dev.  Mean Median  Mean  Median  
Observations 81  64  17 
            
Age  26.719 21.452 14.640  27.764 22.011  22.788  19.518 * 
Workforce 36.300 31.500 26.340  36.594 32.500  35.125  31.000  
Assets  4.510 2.601 4.866  5.116 3.385  2.279 ** 1.450 ** 
Sales 7.071 4.259 7.511  8.062 4.869  3.340 ** 3.066 * 
Growth 0.086 0.070 0.222  0.083 0.079  0.097  0.029  
ROA 0.025 0.032 0.122  0.020 0.033  0.044  0.000  
ROE -0.004 0.075 0.722  0.013 0.075  - 0.070  0.087  
VIROE 0.091 0.101 0.111  0.094 0.099  0.082  0.132  
Liquidity 1.713 1.451 0.921  1.682 1.414  1.832  1.492  
Leverage 0.653 0.647 0.305  0.667 0.660  0.601  0.576  
Innovation 0.825  0.382  0.794   0.940 *   
LT debt-need 0.429  0.498  0.459   0.313    
Working capital 0.167 0.098 0.341  0.197 0.136  0.053 * 0.059 * 
Invest-need 0.309  0.465  0.266   0.470 *   
            
 
The sample consists of 81 French SMEs for the year 2011. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
This table reports the means, medians, standard deviations, and tests of differences in the means and medians between firms with one bank and firms with several banks 
(Student t-statistics tests for differences in means and Wilcoxon z-statistics tests for differences in medians).  





Univariate analysis on banking relationship characteristics 
 
 
 Full sample  SMEs with multiple 
banking 
Multibank=1 
 SMEs with one bank 
Multibank = 0 
  Mean        Mean    Mean   
Observations                       69               59                     10 
            
Rating knowledge  0.377   0.424    0.100**   
Bank knowledge  0.551   0.593    0.300*   
Frequency  0.806   0.825    0.700   
Rate  0.303   0.250    0.600*   
Distance  0.449   0.508    0.100**   
CEO tenure  0.895   0.931    0.778*   
            
 
The sample consists of 69 French SMEs for the year 2011. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
This table reports means, medians, standard deviations, and tests of differences in means (Student t-statistics) between firms with one bank and firm with several banks. 
***, **, * denote that the difference in means for characteristics of the firms with one bank versus several bank samples is significant at 1%, 5%, or 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Multiple banking and firms’ characteristics (Framework one) 
 
Models (Ia) (Ib) (Ic) (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) 
       
Assets 0.242*** 0.218*** 0.186*** 0.253*** 0.262*** 0.192*** 
 (2.597) (2.677) (2.599) (2.662) (2.745) (2.338) 
       
ROE 0.740*** 0.751*** 0.609***    
 (2.729) (2.848) (2.648)    
       
VIROE    2.208** 1.952** 2.117** 
    (2.248) (2.559) (2.334) 
       
Leverage 3.425*** 2.812*** 2.190*** 3.727** 4.094*** 3.666*** 
 (2.978) (3.072) (2.662) (3.152) (3.725) (3.712) 
       
Innovation −1.384* −1.638** −1.532** −1.069** −0.892* −1.358*** 
 (−1.925) (−2.030) (−2.444) (−2.160) (−1.873) (−2.946) 
       
Working capital 3.771*** 3.637** 1.770* 3.932** 3.782*** 4.159*** 
 (2.160) (2.432) (1.818) (2.355) (2.759) (3.476) 













       
       
Constant −0.788 −0.107 0.392 1.213** −1.930* −1.089 
 (0.474) (−0.107) (0.4186) (2.373) (−1.847) (−1.216) 
       
Observations 80 94 94 66 94 94 
McFadden R2 33.19% 34.16% 26.42% 36.96% 36.28% 36.47% 
AIC 69.29 78.07 85.60 58.60 76.00 75.82 












Rate of correct 
classification 
81.2% 84.0% 83.0% 83.3% 81.9% 86.2% 

The full sample consists of 94 French SMEs for the year 2011. The dependent variable is the binary variable Multibank. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
The probit regressions are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The z-values are in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.





Multiple banking and banking relationship characteristics (Framework two) 
 
Models (IIIa) (IIIb) (IIIc) (IVa) (IVb) (IVc) 
       
Rating knowledge 1.567*** 1.361*** 2.047*** 1.165** 1.184*** 1.686*** 
 (3.080 ) (3.165) (3.890) (1.993) (2.664) (2.743) 
       
       
Frequency 0.922 1.058** 0.879    
 (1.543) (2.167) (1.343)    
       
Rate −0.830*    −1.025*** −1.532*** −0.929* −0.889*** −1.539*** 
 (−1.891) (−2.859) (−3.837) (−1.878) (−2.589) (0.0003) 
       
Distance 1.348* 1.646**  1.691** 1.243** 1.353*** 1.479** 
 (1.647) (2.121) (2.052) (1.994) (2.631) (2.507) 
       
CEO tenure    1.408***  0.505 1.320** 
    (1.987) (0.880) (2.274) 
       
Constant -0.127      -0.333 -0.0623 -0.731 0.106 -0.451    
 (-0.231) (-0.755) (-0.102) (-1.197) (0.187) (-0.888) 
Observations 65 94 94 50 94 94 
McFadden R2 31.39% 34.93% 50.41% 37.63% 33.61% 48.30% 
AIC 48.30 73.32 58.26 39.40 74.61 60.31 












Rate of correct 
classification 
89.2% 86.2% 92.6% 90.0% 85.1% 91.5% 
 
The full sample consists of 94 French SMEs for the year 2011. The dependent variable is the binary variable Multibank. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
The probit regressions are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The z-values are in parentheses. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 Likelihood-ratio test, probabilties are in parentheses. 
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Table 7 
Multiple banking, firms’ characteristics and banking relationship characteristics (combined models) 
 
Models (Va) (Vb) (VIa) (VIb) (VIIa)! (VIIb)! (VIIIa)! (VIIIb)!
     # # # #
Assets 0.253**   0.208 0.159** 0.036 0.234# 0.203# 0.136# 0.063#
 (2.263) (1.361) (2.088) (0.485) (1.612)# (1.411)# (1.503)# (0.764)#
     # # # #
ROE 1.932*** 2.976***         1.123***# 2.675***# # #
 (3.444) (2.957)   (2.632)# (3.161)# # #
     # # # #
VIROE   2.426*** 3.330*** # # 2.523***# 3.297***#
   (2.789) (2.586) # # (3.041)# (2.710)#
     # # # #
Leverage 3.750***       4.392***       3.371*** 3.202*** 5.140***# 4.419***# 3.931***# 3.675***#
 (3.011) (3.217) (2.864) (2.718) (3.045)# (3.389)# (3.517)# (3.243)#
     # # # #
Innovation −4.422** 
(−2.450)       
−6.774** 






(-2.207)# -5.885** (-2.208)# -1.243* (-1.801)# -1.524* (-1.895)#
     # # # #
Working capital 5.380** 
(2.536)         
2.955*** 






(2.300)# 2.647** (2.204)# 4.039** (2.287)# 4.053** (2.339)#
     # # # #
Invest-need −1.569** 
(−2.437)       
−1.839*** 






(-2.578)# -1.699***  (-2.584)# -1.129** (-2.248)# -1.093** (-2.128)#
     # # # #
Rating knowledge 1.726***       2.571***      1.347*** 1.825*** 1.347*# 2.161**# 0.848# 1.145*#
 (3.266) (3.062) (3.126) (2.919) (1.901)# (2.326)# (1.388)# (1.710)#
     # # # #
Frequency 1.778***       1.324      1.156** 1.205* # # # #
 (2.818) (1.600) (1.964) (1.754) # # # #
     # # # #
Rate − 0.984**      −2.305***       -0.707 -1.632*** -1.497***# -2.413***# -0.920**# -1.596***#
 (−2.155) (−4.195) (-1.579) (-3.159) (-3.021)# (-4.209)# (-2.015)# (-3.122)#
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     # # # #
Distance 2.183*** 2.509***       1.917** 2.191*** 2.138***# 2.088***# 1.693***# 1.826***#
 (3.016) (3.340) (2.468) (2.683) (3.045)# (3.087)# (3.037)# (2.950)#
     # # # #
CEO tenure     -0.126 1.255* 0.132 1.381** 
     (-0.220)# (1.777)# (0.231)# (2.369)#










(1.049)# 2.481 (0.956)# -1.509 (-1.354)# -1.905 (-1.541)#
     # # # #
Observations 94 94 94 94 94# 94# 94# 94#
McFadden R2 62.21%    71.84%    57.47% 69.21% 61.06%# 68.28%# 58.04%# 66.59%#
AIC 58.77 49.40 63.39 51.96 59.89# 52.86# 62.83# 54.51#











(0.00%)# 66.45 (0.00%)# 56.48 (0.00%)# 64.80 (0.00%)#
Rate of correct 
classification 
93.6% 94.7% 90.4% 94.7% 92.6%# 94.7%# 88.3%# 93.6%#
 
The full sample consists of 94 French SMEs for the year 2011. The dependent variable is the binary variable Multibank. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
The probit regressions are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The z-values are in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 





Comparison of the goodness of fit values of the models derived from framework 




Framework one Framework two Combined models 










McFadden R2 34.16% 36.28% 34.93% 33.61% 62.21% 57.47% 61.06% 58.04% 
AIC 78.07 76.00 73.32 74.61 58.77 63.39 59.89 62.83 
BIC 95.87 93.81 86.04 87.32 86.75 91.37 87.87 90.80 
Rate of correct 
classification 
















McFadden R2 26.42% 36.47% 50.41% 48.30% 71.84%    69.21% 68.28% 66.59% 
AIC 85.60 75.82 58.26 60.31 49.40 51.96 52.86 54.51 
BIC 103.40 93.62 70.97 73.02 77.38 79.94 80.84 82.49 
Rate of correct 
classification 
83.0% 86.2% 92.6% 91.5% 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 93.6% 
 
The models are run on the entire sample (94 French SMEs for the year 2011) with imputation of the missing variables. .  




Variable index: definitions 
Variable  Definition Source 
Multibank Dummy variable that equals 1 if the SME is engaged in a multiple banking relationship and 0 otherwise SURVEY 
Age Age of the SME (years) at the time the survey was completed ALTARES 
Workforce Number of employees in 2011 ALTARES 
Assets Total assets, in million euros (M€) in 2011 ALTARES 
Sales Net sales, in million euros (M€) in 2011 ALTARES 
Growth One-year sales growth (2010-2011) ALTARES 
ROA Return on assets 2011 ALTARES 
ROE Return on equity 2011 ALTARES 
VIROE The average value of ROE computed over a 4-year (2007-2010) period ALTARES 
Liquidity Ratio of current assets to current liabilities ALTARES 
Leverage Ratio of debts to total assets  ALTARES 
Innovation Dummy variable that equals 1 if the SME answered “no” to the question  “Is your firm innovative according to the definition of the French Tax Code?” and 0 otherwise SURVEY 
LT debt-need Dummy variable that equals 1 if the SME answered “yes” to the question  
“Has your firm applied for a long-term loan since 2007?” and 0 otherwise 
SURVEY 
Working capital  Ratio of working capital to net sales ALTARES 
Invest-need Dummy variable that equals 1 if the SME answered “yes” to the question “Did your firm invest since the beginning of the crisis in 2007?” and 0 otherwise SURVEY 
Rating knowledge Dummy variable that equals 1 if the SME answered “yes” to the question “Do you know the criteria used by your bank in the rating process?” and 0 otherwise SURVEY 
Bank knowledge Dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager thinks that he has knowledge about how a bank works, and 0 otherwise  
Frequency Dummy variable that equals 1 if the SME answered “yes” to the question “Do you have exchanges on a weekly basis with the loan officer of your main bank?” and 0 otherwise SURVEY 
Rate Dummy variable that equals 1 if the SME answered “no” to the question  “Do you systematically look for the lower interest rate when applying for credit?” and 0 otherwise SURVEY 
Distance Dummy variable that equals 1 if the SME answered “yes” to the question “Is your loan officer located in a business center?” and 0 if it is located in a bank branch SURVEY 
CEO tenure Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO started in his position more than 5 years ago and 0 otherwise SURVEY 
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Appendix B 
Pearson correlations for quantitative variables 
 
 Age Workforce Assets Sales Growth ROA ROE VIROE Liquidity Leverage Working capital 
Age 1 -0.013 0.104 0.124 -0.107 -0.064 0.099 0.059 0.052 0.028 0.018 
Workforce  1 0.305*** 0.336*** -0.042 -0.196* -0.097 -0.063 -0.039 0.115 -0.144 
Assets   1 0.735*** -0.056 0.060 -0.039 0.006 0.104 -0.283** 0.466*** 
Sales    1 0.068 0.013 0.013 0.034 -0.035 -0.064 0.022 
Growth     1 0.202* -0.021 0.007 0.017 -0.066 -0.225* 
ROA      1 0.026 0.382*** 0.162 -0.439*** 0.046 
ROE       1 0.128 0.021 -0.014 0.044 
VIROE        1 0.096 -0.004 -0.029 
Liquidity         1 -0.215* -0.015 
Leverage          1 -0.289*** 
Working capital           1 
!
The sample consists of 81 French SMEs for the year 2011. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
***, **, and * indicate that the correlation coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively (Pearson correlation test). 
!
Appendix C 
P-value of Chi-2 dependence tests for qualitative variables 
 




knowledge! Frequency! Rate! Distance! CEO tenure!Innovation# 1.754 0.091 0.281 0.053 0.329 0.731 0.247 1.336 
LT debt-need  0.402 0.132 0.527 0.000 2.499 03029 0.140 
Invest-need#   0.473 0.053 0.697 1.758 2.243 0.031 
Rating knowledge#    3.380* 0.367 0.004 1.341 2.935* 
Bank knowledge#     1.513 1.425 0.880 1.258 
Frequency#      0.000 0.373 7.325*** 
Rate#       2.764 0.001 
Distance#        1.258 
 
The sample consists of 69 French SMEs for the year 2011. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
***, ** and * indicate that the correlation coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.!
